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Abstract—The recent surge of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks
consisting of thousands of of hosts makes them a breeding ground
for malware proliferation. Although some existing studies have
shown that malware proliferation can pose significant threats to
P2P networks, defending against such an attack is largely an
open problem. This paper aims to develop the countermeasure
that can effectively mitigate the malware proliferation while
preserving P2P networks’ performance. To this end, we propose
a dynamic trust management scheme based upon localized trust
evaluation and alert propagation which prevents innocent peers
from downloading files from infected peers. Our analysis and
experimental results show that our approach can effectively
reduce the malware proliferation rate.
Index Terms—P2P systems, Malware proliferation, Dynamic
trust.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the explosive surge of Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
networks has been astounding. While P2P networks facilitate
the content distribution, they offer a breeding ground for
malware proliferation due to their daily thousands of file
downloads. After being initially inserted by malicious peers,
malware can propagate along with the file downloading path.
Consequently, innocent peers incidentally downloading those
infected files will become new sources of infection. In this
manner, malware propagates itself to a large number of peers
within a short period, posing a significant threat to P2P
networks.
Since content distribution such as file sharing is the main
venue of the malware proliferation in P2P networks, those
network-based anti-malware systems, such as packet filter
firewalls or traffic anomaly monitors, are ineffective. Although
deploying application based firewall in the P2P network could
mitigate the attack, this approach can drastically downgrade
the system performance due to the huge volume of traffic in the
P2P network. Therefore, it is desirable to develop the malware
defense based on the P2P network itself.
We highlight the subtle yet important differences among our
study, P2P worms [1], [2] and P2P pollution [3], [4]. The threat
that we deal with is generalized malware, including viruses,
spyware or even worms, which propagates itself by taking
advantage of the content distribution of P2P networks. P2P-
based worms studied in [1], [2] is a specific type of worm
that exploits the common vulnerabilities among the P2P client
software and hunts its preys by scanning other P2P peers
via various means, such as P2P overlay network topology.
Pollution attacks intend to disrupt the P2P file sharing services
by alluring peers to download corrupted files, e.g., mp3 files
which cannot be played [5]. Obviously, the pollution tactics
can be used for malware propagation. However, corrupted
files are always detected by every user, whereas malware
is unfortunately not, since detecting and removing malware
depend on many factors, including the capability of peers’
anti-malware software and users’ security awareness etc.
To effectively mitigate the malware proliferation in the P2P
network, it is critical to design schemes that prevent innocent
peers downloading files from “bad” peers harboring contagious
files. In this paper we propose a new countermeasure called
dynamic trust management scheme based upon localized trust
evaluation and propagation. In particular, we adopt a trust
mechanism among all peers. Every peer locally manages her
trusts to neighboring peers based on the quality of previously
downloaded files. A peer always downloads files from those
with the highest trust. If malware is detected, a peer reduces
her trust on the involved file provider. A trust degradation
greater than a prescribed threshold will trigger a trust alert
propagation to related peers, which then make appropriate
adjustments as well. Our analysis and simulation results
demonstrate that this approach can significantly reduce the
malware proliferation rate.
II. A DYNAMIC TRUST MANAGEMENT SCHEME
A. Design Rationale
We consider an adversary who attempts to propagate mal-
ware to peers in a P2P network for malicious purposes, e.g.,
stealing user identities, using the infected hosts to form botnets
[6], [7]. The adversary may join the P2P network using several
legitimate identities and prepares a large number of malware-
carrying files to share with others. An innocent peer becomes
infected if she downloads and opens an infected file. Once
the malware is activated in one peer, it may infect other files
in the victim’s file directory. To detect the malware, a user
may conduct anti-malware scanning on her file downloaded
directory. Malware could be detected by an anti-malware soft-
ware with negligible false positives and false negatives. Once
being detected, the malware is removed locally. We assume
the existence of a PGP (pretty-good-privacy)-like public key
infrastructure such that the integrity of peer communications
are ensured.
The basic idea of our scheme is to incorporate a dynamic
trust management within the P2P network. The fact that peer
A has a trust on peer B reflects the degree of A’s expectation
on the probability of a correct file downloading from B. The
more trust A has on B, the higher the expectation. Each peer
in our system trusts a set of peers called trustees and is trusted
by another set of peers called trusters. A peer’s trustee set and
truster set may have an overlap. A peer selects the source of
her file download based on her trusts on the file providers.
Without loss of generality, we now use peer A as an example
to provide the overview of our scheme.
During the registration or boot-up process, A obtains a list
of peers, from which she is able to select a group of peers
as her trustees. Other peers who are aware of A’s arrival
may add A to their trustees. When A needs to download a
file, she broadcasts her query to all her trustees. From those
who reply positively, A selects the one with the highest trust
value, say B, as the download source. Once the download
interaction completes, A adjusts her trust value on B. For
example, a failed download or an infected file may cause A
to degrade her trust on B. If the trust degradation is greater
than a prescribed threshold, an alert of trust adjustment is
triggered and broadcasted to A’s trusters. Depending on their
trusts on A and trusts on B, A’s trusters may respond to the
alert in different ways. A’s trusters make necessary downgrade
of their trusts on B, which may likely trigger another alert. In
this manner, the alert of the degradation of B’s credibility is
proactively propagated to a subset of B’s trusters.
Despite the apparently straightforward mechanism of our
proposed scheme, several key issues need to be considered.
• The trigger of a trust propagation depends on the thresh-
old of trust degradation. A too low threshold would cause
unnecessary network communication overhead while a
too high threshold would possibly result in a delayed
propagation and consequently more infected peers.
• A peer’s response to an alert is crucial to the effectiveness
of the defense system as well. An overly sensitive peer
may unnecessarily expand the range of a propagation
while a reckless peer may cause negligence of the mal-
ware alert.
• Like a route update in routing protocols, a trust propa-
gation algorithm must converge quickly. In other words,
an alert should not cause peers to repetitively send and
receive the same event.
B. Detail Design
Consider a P2P network of n peers denoted by V =
{v1, v2, · · · , vn}. We define the trust value to be a quotient
number in [−1,−1] ∪ [0, 1]. If peer vi has −1 trust value
on peer vj , vi distrusts vj . Trust value 0 implies a neutral
trust and trust value 1 represents the highest trust. Peer
vi’s trustees are organized in a trustee table, denoted as
Ti = {〈vj , tj〉|vj ∈ V, tij ∈ [0, 1]}, where tij is the value of
vi’s trust on vj ; and vi trusters are organized in a truster set,
denoted as Si ⊂ V . Our design complies with the well-known
trust decay rule [8]: a person tends to have much more trust
on those referred by his/her immediate friends than on those
referred by friends of friends. More generally, the trust value
decreases proportionally to the “social” distance between two
peers.
In our system, there are a system-wide parameter φ and a
function F (x) used by all peers.
• φ: 0 < φ < 1, the trust variation threshold for triggering
a trust alert.
• F (x) : [0, 1] → [0, 1], the trust value computation
function, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 is the download success rate
with respect to a peer.
In the following, we introduce four core procedures of our
proposed scheme.
1) Initialization: When a new peer (say vi) wants to join
the P2P network, the initialization task consists of two parts.
One is to initialize vi’s trust values on a set of peers and the
other is for other peers to assign their trust values on vi.
The new peer vi is given a list of peers as its trustee
candidates by a bootstrapping server. Along with the addresses
of those candidates, the system provides other individual
information, such as their online histories, nationalities, file
depository size, interests. Based on the information and her
own security profile, vi initializes her Ti by selecting those
peers from the candidate list and assigning them positive trust
values. If the size of Ti is not large enough, she may invoke
a referring process. A referring process allows vi’s trustees to
introduce more trustee candidates to vi. To start a referring
process, vi selects the trustees, say vj , with the highest trust
value as her reference peer. vj then sends her trustee table Tj
to vi. For an entry 〈vk, tjk〉 in Tj , vi computes tik = tij×tjk,
where tkj is vi’s trust on vj . If tik is large enough to satisfy
vi’s security profile, she inserts 〈vk, tik〉 into Ti.
Once Ti is finalized, vi sends all peers in Ti a message
which encloses vi’s individual information and notifies them
that vi has trust on them. Accordingly, peers in Ti insert vi to
their truster sets and may also assign their trust on vi according
to vi’s profile.
2) File Search: To download a file f , peer vi sends a
file query to all her trustees in Ti. If positive responses
are received, vi selects the trustee with the highest trust as
the download source. If no positive responses are received,
vi sends a help query to all her trustees. Each vi’s trustee
recursively searches for f with the help of their own trustees
respectively. Without loss of generality, suppose that vj ∈ Ti
and vk ∈ Tj , vk replies to vj positively. vj then sends
a positive reply to vi which contains the identity of vk
and the trust value tjk on vk. We denote vk as a referred
trustee recommended by vj . vi’s potential trust value on vk
is computed as tik = tij × tjk. Among all referred trustees,
vi downloads the file directly from the one with the highest
potential trust value.
3) Local Trust Update: For each trustee in Ti, vi maintains
a download transaction record. After downloading files from
a peer vj , vi reevaluates her trust on vj according to the
success rate (denoted by ρij) of interactions with vj , which
is calculated as the fraction of success downloads among all
downloads from vj . A failure is defined as the occurrence of a
malware infected file downloaded from vj . vi then computes
t′ij = F (ρij). If tij − t′ij > φ, vj replaces tij with t′ij as
the new trust value, and executes the propagation procedure
to alert other peers as shown in the next subsection.
4) Propagation of Trust Alert: An alert is flagged once a
peer detects a significant drop of trust on another peer. A
propagation of alert warns other peers who have not noticed
the trustworthiness downgrade. In this proactive way, there
will be a smaller possibility for innocent peers being exposed
to malware. Consequently, the proliferation of malware is
suppressed. Peer vi’s alert message is of the following format:
(ID, P,∆, d), where ID uniquely identifies the alert, defined
as the binary concatenation of time and vi’s id; P is the id of
the subject peer of this alert, e.g. vj’s id; ∆ is the magnitude
of the trust downgrade, e.g tij−t′ij ; d is the maximum number
of hops this alert is allowed to travel.
Peer vi broadcasts the message to all peers in her truster
set, (instead of her trustee set). A peer receiving an alert
from vi adjusts the relevant trust value accordingly and may
forward this alert to her trusters. In general, when a peer vj
receives an alert (ID, vm,∆, d) from vk, she responds in the
following manner: if (ID, vm) is duplicated with a previously
received alert or vm 6∈ Tj , this alert is dropped immediately.
Otherwise, vj sets tjm = tjm − tjk∆. If tjk∆ < φ or
d = 1, vj terminates her response procedure. Otherwise, she
prepares for forwarding the alert by setting d = d − 1 and
∆ = tjk∆. The other two fields are not changed. The new
alert is sent to all vj’s trusters. Note that the propagation
converges quickly since both ∆ and d decrease after one hop.
Due to the length limit, we skip the discussion on the timing
of arrivals of the same alerts sent from different sources. Our
detailed algorithms include the setting up of a timeout window
and the management of a message buffer to accommodate the
variance of alert propagation delays due to different routes.
More details are presented in a full version of the paper.
C. Discussions
Our scheme has several salient features summarized as
follows.
1) Push-based Trust Adjustment: In existing trust or rep-
utation schemes [9], [10], a peer needs to pull relevant data
from either a group of peers or a centralized server in the
network. By contrast, a peer in our scheme updates her
trust on other peers in a more timely fashion. An alert of a
service degradation from a peer is pushed to related peers who
promptly make their own appropriated responses. For defend-
ing against poisonous file spreading [11], both pull and push
approaches have relatively equivalent effects. However, our
push-based approach outperforms its counterpart when dealing
with malware propagation. This is because malware detection
suffers from a false positive rate (a.k.a miss rate). Push-based
approach enables one successful detection to be propagated
to multiple peers who might fail the detection. Compared to
pull-based schemes, our scheme is more proactive and prevent
more peers from contacting infected files.
2) Negative Alert: In our scheme, only a negative trust
variation triggers an alert propagation. One might argue that
a positive trust adjustment should be propagated as well.
Nonetheless, propagating positive alerts may becomes a vul-
nerability exploited by an adversary. For instance, a collusion
of adversaries are able to take advantage of it and convince
other honest peers to trust a malicious peer. With negative
trust propagation, faked alerts only lead to a DoS attack on
a well-behaved peer. Considering the nature of file sharing
and the fully distributed P2P networks, such DoS attacks in a
individual user lack strong motivations.
3) Localized Trust Management: All trust value compu-
tations in our scheme are executed locally and do not re-
quire peer interactions during the computation. Therefore, our
scheme has a better computational efficiency than those global
or local reputation schemes which require interactions with
other peers to compute a reputation. Our scheme does not
involve any global algorithms, nor requires a system-wide
consistency among peers’ trusts. Those global algorithms such
as voting schemes, reputation schemes, usually become the
target of attacks and may consequently be misused. Once
such a scheme is manipulated by an attacker, its adversarial
effect is even worse than not applying it. In our scheme, each
peer independently manages her own trusts to others. By not
relying on any centralized service or system-wide mechanisms,
our scheme minimizes both the incentive of attacks and the
vulnerabilities exploited by an adversary.
4) Socialized Trust: Our trust management conforms with
the recent trend of incorporating the social network concept
into P2P networks [12]. It is more efficient and natural for
users with common interests to share files with each other. We
envision that relatively stable socialized connections are less
risky and more effective for user to search and download files
than volatile random connections. Moreover, the socialization
provides the agreeable and robust infrastructure to the trust
management, since it is not effective to employ trust for
volatile random associations.
5) Content Availability: Content availability is a critical
performance metric to evaluate a P2P network’s service.
Although our trust-based approach deters the proliferation
of malware, it does not hinder the dissemination of benign
contents. Note that most anti-malware software have negligible
false negatives. An honest user’s file service will not be
affected. Moreover, even if a malicious user launches a DoS
attack on a user, the impact of her faulty alarms depends
on both the number of her trusters and her own credibility.
Therefore, the malicious user has to provide better services
to maximize the impact, which to some extent offsets the
adversarial effect of her attacks.
III. ANALYSIS
To characterize malware proliferation over the P2P network,
we adopt the epidemic dynamic model for the theoretical
analysis [13] and carry out an analysis using discrete time
to derive recursive formulae for the malware proliferation.
For i ≥ 0, let I(i) be the number of infected peers in the P2P
network at the beginning of the ith period. Suppose that each
peer launches λ downloads during the ith period. Let αi be the
probability of contacting an infectious peer for each file query
during the ith period and β be the probability of every peer
successfully identifying a downloaded malware. Therefore, for
each query in the ith period, a peer has τi = αi(1 − β)
probability of being infected. Let τ¯i = 1− τi. We assume that
there are initially I0 malicious peers uniformly distributed in
the systems. Thus, I(0) = I0 and α0 = I0/n.
We define a random variable Xi,j ∈ {0, 1} which represents
the event that the jth uninfected peer, j ∈ [1, n − I(i)],
becomes infected by the end of the ith period. In particular, if
the jth uninfected peer is finally infected, Xi,j = 1; otherwise,
Xi,j = 0.
For a native P2P network, we have P(Xi,j = 0) = (1−τi)λ
and P(Xi,j = 1) = 1 − (1 − τi)λ. Thus, we have the mean
of Xi,j : E(Xi,j) = 1 − τ¯iλ. The average number of newly
infected peers during the ith duration is E(
∑n−I(i)
j=1 Xi,j) =
(n−I(i))(1−τˆiλ). According to our assumption of the uniform
distribution of infected peers, we have αi =
I(i)
n . Thus, the
number of infected peers in the (i+ 1)th duration is
I(i+ 1) = I(i) + (n− I(i))(1− τ¯iλ), (1)
where τ¯i = 1− (1− β)αi. Approximately, we have{
αi =
I(i)
n ,
I(i+ 1) = I(i) + λ(n− I(i))αi(1− β). (2)
Since λ mainly depends on the user behaviors, we treat
it as a constant. Therefore, the effectiveness of a security
mechanism dealing with malware proliferation relies on the
magnitude of increasing α¯i, or equivalently reducing αi.
In essence, our dynamic trust management scheme is to re-
duce αi by preventing peers from contacting known malicious
ones. To simplify the modeling, we suppose that a trust alert
is propagated to m peers in average. In addition, we assume
that every user will postpone all removals of malicious peers
detected during the ith period to the end of the period. We
define a random variable Zi,j to represent the event that the
jth infected peer, j ∈ [1, I(i)], is detected by a peer during
one download. In particular, if the jth infected peer is detected
during the ith period, Zi,j = 1; otherwise, Zi,j = 0. Therefore,
we have P(Zi,j = 1) = βαi and P(Zi,j = 0) = 1− βαi.
Let Yi be the average number of infected peers identified
in the ith period. According to our model simplified as mλ
Bernoulli trials, we have Yi = mλβαi. Therefore,
αi+1 =
I(i)−mλβαi
n−mλβαi . (3)
Moreover, since peers share their alerts, we have approx-
imately P(Xi,j = 1) = λτi(1 − β/n)(m−1)λ. Thus,
E(
∑n−I(i)
j=1 Xi,j) = λτi(n− I(i))(1− β/n)(m−1)λ. Then, we
have
I(i+ 1) = I(i) +λ(n− I(i))αi(1−β)(1−β/n)(m−1)λ. (4)
Approximately, we have{
αi+1 =
I(i)−mλβαi
n−mλβαi ,
I(i+ 1) = I(i) + λ(n− I(i))αi(1− β)(1− mβλn ).
(5)
Compare Equation 5 against Equation 2, we conclude that
our proposed trust propagation scheme reduces the growth rate
of I(i) by both decreasing the contacting probability αi from
I(i)
n to
I(i)−mλβαi
n−mλβαi and decreasing the missing rate of malware
detection from (1−β) to (1−β)(1−mβλn )). Also, we conclude
that a larger m and a larger β are always favorable to mitigate
the malware proliferation whereas increasing λ may not. Note
that our focus in this analysis is to model the proliferation
of malware by counting the increment of infected peers. It is
easy to revise the above model to consider the case where a
peer recovers from an infected state to a clean state.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We simulate a small scale P2P network with an emphasis
on the effectiveness of our scheme, without tuning various
parameters mentioned in Section II and Section III. Our simu-
lated network consists of 100 randomly connected peers. Each
node has no more than 10 neighbors. Based on the previous
studies on content distribution [14], [15], we implement a Zipf
content distribution model. Since the number of distinct files
usually is around 10 times of the number of peers [16], we
initialize 1000 distinct files with various copies in the system.
Only about 10% peers have more than 100 files while most
peers have much less files to share.
Among all peers, we randomly select 10 of them as ma-
licious peers whose files are marked as malware. We assign
every honest peer vi a random number βi ∈ [0.6, 1]. If vi
downloads an infected file, she will be marked as an infected
peer with a probability 1− βi. This probability is to simulate
her local capability in malware detection. We do not simulate
the local file infection. In other words, when an innocent peer
downloads a file containing malware, other existing files in
her storage directory are not contaminated.
In our experiments, we compare the malware prolifera-
tion rate in the same system with different countermeasure
schemes: (1) Baseline scheme. In this scheme, the P2P network
offers no security countermeasures to resist malware prolifer-
ation. Each peer randomly selects the download source and
relies on her own capability to detect malware. (2) Scheme
with trust only. In this scheme, the network has a basic trust
scheme. Every peer downloads files according to the trust
relations and locally manages her trusts on neighbors based
on the quality of the historical interactions. However, no trust
alert is propagated. (3) Scheme with trust and propagation. In
this scheme, our proposed dynamic trust management scheme
is adopted.
We measure the total number of infected peers, including the
initial 10 malicious peers, to evaluate the malware proliferation
rate. After every 50 downloads, we take a snapshot of the
system to collect the number of infected peers. The results for
three schemes are shown in Figure 1.
Due to the experimental randomness, the gradient of the
lines may vary from experiment to experiment. Nonetheless,
the curve of the baseline scheme always stays on the top
whereas the curve of trust propagation always stays at the
bottom and remains horizontal almost for every experiment.
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Fig. 1. A comparison of malware proliferation rates in three schemes
We make two important observations from our experimental
results. First, using anti-malware software alone cannot suc-
cessfully prevent malwares from spreading in P2P networks.
Those users with weaker malware detection capability will
become the victims and the accomplices of malware spreading.
Second, our proposed scheme is able to effectively suppress
the malware spreading, since the peers virtually share their
anti-malware detections. Although our experiment set is rel-
atively small compared to those P2P networks in real-world,
we argue that the scale of the network does not overturn our
conclusion. Specifically, few large networks in practice are
randomly connected, since the network interactions always
exhibit locality patterns. Therefore, a large network can be
treated as a congregation of a number of small scale networks.
The capability of the proposed scheme actually depends on the
locality pattern, rather than the overall system size.
V. RELATED WORK
The modeling of worm propagation and pollution attacks
in P2P networks is studied in [2], [3], [4], [11] etc. For
instance, Yu et al. in [2] modeled the P2P network based
worm attacks and revealed that a worm can propagate more
rapidly over the Internet by using the P2P network. There are
a few research efforts for developing countermeasures against
worm propagation and pollution attacks. For example, Zou
et al. in [1] investigated the worms that taking advantage of
P2P weakness and proposed several countermeasures based on
individual P2P peers to carry out detection and post-detection
mitigation.
Our work is also related to the reputation and trust system
research [9], [10]. These approaches are either based on
centralized management or on a tacit assumption that trust
or reputation of a node reflects the majority nodes’ trust in
the whole network. However, for a large scale P2P network,
it is infeasible to obtain votes from a majority of the whole
system due to the performance constraints. On the contrary, a
peer only contacts a small fraction of the whole population.
An adversary may take advantage of this limitation to abuse
these reputation and trust systems. Our work is also related
to a recent research [12] that incorporates the social-network
concept into P2P networks to facilitate content discovery and
downloading.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the issue of defeating the malware
proliferation over the P2P network. We propose a dynamic
trust management scheme based upon local trust evaluation
and propagation. Our proposed scheme has several salient
features such as push-based trust adjustment, localized trust
management, etc. Both the analysis and the experimental
evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme
in terms of low malware proliferation rate. Our study helps
to safeguard P2P users from malware proliferation when
distributing files.
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